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ABSTRACT 
The concepts of declarative memory and procedural memory have been used to dis-
tinguish two basic types of learning. A neural network model suggests how such memory 
processes work together as recognition learning, reinforcement learning, and sensory-motor 
learning take place during adaptive behaviors. To coordinate these processes, the hippocam-
pal formation and cerebellum each contain circuits that learn to adaptively time their out-
puts. Within the model, hippocampal timing helps to maintain attention on motivationally 
salient goal objects during variable task-related delays, and cerebellar timing controls the 
release of conditioned responses. This property is part of the model's description of how 
cognitive-emotional interactions focus attention on motivationally valued cues, and how this 
process breaks clown clue to hippocampal ablation. The model suggests that the hippocampal 
mechanisms that help to rapidly draw attention to salient cues could prematurely release mo-
tor commands were not the release of these commands aclaptively timed by the cerebellum. 
'I'he model hippocampal system modulates cortical recognition learning without actually 
encoding the representational information that the cortex encodes. These properties avoid 
the difficulties faced by several models that propose a direct hippocampal role in recog-
nition learning. Learning within the model hippocampal system controls adaptive timing 
and spatial orientation. Model properties hereby clarify how hippocampal ablations cause 
amnesic symptoms and difficulties with tasks which combine task delays, novelty detection, 
and attention towards goal objects amid distractions. When these model recognition, rein-
forcement, sensory-motor, and timing processes work together, they suggest how the brain 
can accomplish conditioning of multiple sensory events to delayed rewards, as during serial 
compound conditioning. 
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Some Neural Substrates of Declarative and Procedural Memory 
A central problem in cognitive neuroscience concerns how humans and other animals 
learn to recognize objects, to predict and attend to their rewarding or punishing conse-
quences, and to perform appropriately timed actions capable of realizing or avoiding these 
consequences. Multiple brain regions participate in these processes, in eluding inferotem-
poral cortex, amygdala, hippocampal formation, and cerebellum. The complexity of these 
processes has led to the development of neural models that might shed light on their cel-
lular and network properties. A neural model is described herein to suggest why both the 
hippocampus and the cerebellum contain circuits that are specialized for adaptive timing. 
Although the two timing circuits may share cellular and circuit properties, the model pre-
dicts that they carry out distinct functional roles during the learning and memory processes 
that subserve recognition and movement tasks. 
These distinct. roles are used to clarify several of the conceptual dichotomies that have 
been useful in research <1bout normal and amnesic learning and memory. One such dichotomy 
concerns the distinctions between declarative memory and procedural memory, knowing that 
and knowing how, memory and habit, or memory with record and memory without record 
(Bruner, HJ69; Mishkin, HJ82, 199:l; Ryle, HJ49; Squire and Cohen, 1984). The amnesic 
patient HM exemplified this distinction by learning and remembering motor skills like as-
sembly of the Tower of Hanoi without being able to recall having done so (Bruner, 1969; 
Cohen and Squire, 1980; Mishkin, 1982; Ryle, 1949; Scoville and Milner, 1957; Squire and 
Cohen, 1984). HM's surgical lesion induded extensive parts of the hippocampal formation 
and amygdala. Subsequent animal studies have shown that damage to the hippocampal 
formation (Ammon's horn, dentate gyrus, subiculum, fornix) and the parahippocampal re-
gion ( entorhinal, perirhimtl, and parahippocampal cortices) can reproduce analogous amnesic 
symptoms (Mishkin, 1978; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991). These results implicate this ag-
gregate hippocampal systern in the processes that regulate declamtive memory, or "knowing 
that". Such processes support a competence for learning recognition categories and being 
able to flexibly access them in a task-specific way (Eichenbaum, Ott;o, and Cohen, 1994). 
A pamllel line of research has implicated the cerebellum in the processing of proce-
dural memory, or "knowing how". The cerebellum is an essential circuit for conditioning 
discrete adaptive responses during eye movements, arm movements, nictitating membra.ne 
movements, and jaw movements (Ebner and Bloedel, 1981; Gilbert and Thach, 1977; Ito, 
1984; Lisberger, 1988; Optican and Robinson, 1980; Thompson, 1988; Thompson et al., 1984, 
1987). Models of cerebellar learning have been developed over the years to help explain these 
motor conditioning data (Albus, 1971; Bullock, Fiala, and Grossberg, 1994; 1'\rjita, 1982a, 
1982b; Grossberg, 1969a, 19G9b; Grossberg and Kuperstein, 1986; Ito, 1984; Lisberger, 1988; 
Marr, 1969). 
A third line of research on learning and memory concerns cognitive-emotional interac-
tions, including how a conditioned stimulus (CS) such as a tone or light, when paired with 
an unconditioned stimulus (US) such as a shock, can learn to generate conditioned responses 
(CR), such as fear or limb withdrawal, that were originally elicited only by the US. Such 
learning is optimal at a range of positive interstimulus intervals (IS!) that are characteris-
tic of the animal and the task, and is greatly attenuated at zero lSI and long ISis (Smith, 
1968). Although the amygdala has been identified as a primary site in the expression of 
emotion and stimulus-reward association (Aggleton, 199:l), the hippocampal formation has 
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also been implicated in the processing of cognitive-emotional interactions. In particular, 
Thompson et al. (1987) distinguished two types of learning that go on during conditioning 
of the rabbit NMR: "conditioned fear" learning linked to the hippocampus and "learning 
of the discrete adaptive response" within the cerebellum (p. 82). In addition, removal of 
the hippocampal formation greatly attenuates attentional blocking (Rickert, Bennett, Lane, 
and French, 1978; Schmajuk, Spear, and. Isaacson, 198:3; Solomon, 1977). Blocking is the 
process whereby conditioning of a cue CS 1 to a US prevents a second cue CS 2 from being 
conditioned to us when it is later presented before us as part of a simultaneous csl + 
CS2 stimulus compound. Much experimental and theoretical work has suggested that CS2 
loses its ability to be conditioned to US because it is an irrelevant cue that predicts no more 
about the US than does CS1 when presented alone (Grossberg, 1975, 1982; Kamin, 1969). 
Blocking enables a learning subject to attend selectively to relevant cues. 
The present article synthesizes, into a single neural architecture, models that have been 
developed to explain data from each of these three areas. This synthesis clarifies how the 
various models work together to control behavior. In particular, it suggests why both the 
cerebellum and the hippocampal system may need adaptive timing circuits for their nor-
mal functioning. We suggest that the hippocmnpal mechanisms that help to rapidly draw 
attention to salient cues could prematurely release motor commands were these commands 
not adaptively timed by the cerebellum. To reach such conclusions as ef£ciently as possible, 
the article provides just enough information about the component models to understand 
how they can work together to explain key data. Mathematical equations and computer 
simulations of these models are described in detail in articles cited below. 
Why should a single, albeit complex, brain region like the hippocampal system be in-
volved in so many proces~;es: recognition learning, reinforcement le<trning, and motivated 
attention? A clue is provided by neural d<tta and models about how each of these processes 
work. In particular, both recognition learning and reinforcement learning are regulated by 
a matching process whereby bottom-up stimuli from the outside world are matched against 
top-down learned expectations to determine whether attentive learning or memory search 
will occur. The unblocking paradigm illustrates this matching process for the case of rein-
forcement learning (Kamin, 1969). The unblocking paradigm is a variant of the blocking 
paradigm in which the US changes intensity in the two learning episodes. Thus if CS1 is 
followed by one US intensity (US1 ), and the compound stimulus CS1 + CSz is followed by 
a different US intensity (US2), then CS2 can become conditioned to the US, unlike in the 
blocking paradigm, and does so with an emotional valence that depends upon the sign of 
the difference US1 - US2 between US 1 and US 2 (Kamin, 1969). The mismateh between the 
actual intensity US2 and the expected intensity US1 triggers a memory search that attention-
ally "unblocks" the representation of CS 2 that is stored in short term memory, and enables 
it to learn to predict the change in US intensity (Grossherg, 1975). This memory search 
helps to foeus attention upon that subset of sensory cues th<tt predicts motivationally salient 
outcomes in a given context, and to block those that do not. 
Recognition learning is accomplished by interactions hetween inferotemporal cortex (!'f) 
and hippocampal formation, among other brain areas (Desimone, 1991; Desimone and Unger-
leider, 1989; Eichenbaum, Otto, and Cohen, 1994; Gochin, Miller, Gross, and Gerstein, 1991; 
Harries and Perrett, 1991; Mishkin, 1978, 1982; Mishkin and Appenzeller, 1987; Perrett, 
Mistlin, and Chitty, 1987; Schwartz, Desimone, Albright, aml Gross, 198:3; Squire and Zola-
2 
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Morgan, 1991). These interactions indude the matching process that modulates the course 
of recognition learning in IT cortex and the course of reinforcement learning in thala.mo-
cortico-amygdala circuits. Some models are analysed below of how these recognition and 
reinforcement learning circuits interact with motor learning circuits. It is shown that the 
behavioral success of this interaction requires both types of circuits to be adaptively timed. 
Stable Learning throughout Life using Adaptive Resonance 
The first type of model results from an analysis of how humans and animals rapidly learn 
to categorize and name events and their contexts in real time. These Adaptive Resonance 
Theory (ART) models have been used to help explain and predict a large body of cognitive 
and neural data about recognition learning, recall, attention, priming, and memory search 
(Carpenter and Grossberg, 1992, Hl9:3; Grossberg, 1982, 1987, 1988a). ART systems realize 
this synthesis by incorporating mechanisms that solve a fundamental problem about learning 
and memory that is called the stability-plasticity dilemma. An adequate self-organizing 
recognition system must be capable of plasticity in order to rapidly learn about significant 
new events, yet its memory must also remain stable in response to irrelevant or often repeated 
events. Thus we can learn to recognize many new faces without risking the unselect.ive 
forgetting of our parents' faces. In AHT, interactions between an attentional subsystem and 
an orienting subsystem, or novelty detector, self-stabilize the learning process as the network 
becomes familiar with an environment by categorizing the information within it in a way 
that leads to behavioral success (Grossberg, 1980). 
Learning takes place in the attentional subsystem. Its processes include activation of 
short term memory (STM) traces, incorporation through learning of STM information into 
a longer-lasting long term memory (LTM) traces, and interactions between pathways that 
carry specific information with nonspecific pathways that modulate the specific pathways. 
These interactions between specific STM and r;rM processes and nonspecific modulatory 
processes regulate the stability-plasticity bala.nce during normal learning, as follows. 
Figure 1 
The attentiona.l subsystem undergoes both bottom-up learning and top-down learning 
between processing levels such as those denoted by .1'1 and F2 in Figure I. Level F1 contains a 
network of nodes, or cell populations, each of which is activated by a. particular combination 
of sensory features. Level .r2 contains a network of nodes that represent recognition codes, or 
categories, which are selectively activated by the activation pattems across .1'1. Each .1'1 node 
sends output signals to a subset of .1'2 nodes. Each .1'2 node thus receives inputs from many 
F1 nodes. The thick pa.thway from F1 to F2 in Figure I A represents the array of diverging 
and converging pathways shown in Figure lB. Learning takes place at the synapses denoted 
by semicircular endings in the .r1 -> .r2 pathways. Pathways that end in arrowheads do not 
undergo learning. This bottom-up learning enables .1'2 nodes to become selectively tuned to 
particular combinations of activation patterns across .1'1 by changing their LTM traces. 
Why is bottom-up learning insufficient in a system that can autonomously solve the 
sti1bility-plasticity dilemma? This analysis was carried out in that part of the ART model 
that combines bottom-up associative learning and lateral inhibition for purposes of learned 
categorization. This type of model is often called a self-organizing feature map, competitive 
learning, or learned vector quantization. In such a model, as shown in Fignre 2A, an input 
. . 
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pattern registers itself as a pattern of activity, or STM, across the feature detectors of level 
F 1. Each F1 output signal is multiplied or gated, by the adaptive weight, or LTM trace, in 
its respective pathway. All these LTM-gated inputs are added up at their target F2 nodes. 
Competitive interactions, mediated by lateral inhibition within .r2, contrast-enhance this 
input pattern. Even if many .r2 nodes may receive inputs from F 1, lateral inhibition acts to 
cause a much smaller set of .r2 nodes to store their activation in STM. 
It is useful to think of all the STM signals that converge on an Fz node as an STM 
pattern, or vector. Likewise, all the r;rM traces that multiply these signals on their way to a 
prescribed F2 node form an LTM vector. The operation of adding up the LTM-gated signals 
at each F2 node is called the inner product, or dot; product, of the two vectors. It measures 
how similar the two vectors are, and increases as a function of their similarity. The LTM 
traces thereby filter the STM signal pattern and generate larger inputs to those F2 nodes 
whose LTM patterns are most oimilar to the STM pattern. 
As noted above, the lateral inhibition among F2 nodes selects just a few of the more 
active F2 nodes for STM storage. This contrast-enhancing operation enables many input 
pat;terns at F1 that share similar input features to be classified by a small set of F2 nodes. 
Tbe Fz nodes hereby become category nodes that are capable of classifying the inputs to F1. 
Figure 2 
In a self-organizing feature map, only the Fz nodes that win the contrast-enhancing 
competition and store their activity in STM can influence the learning process. STM activity 
at the winning .r2 nodes selectively opens a learning gate at the LTM traces that abut these 
nodes. These r;rM traces can then approach, or track, the input signals in their pathways, a 
process called steepest, descent. This learning law is thus often called gated steepest descent, 
or instar learning. In its simplest form, this learning law can be expressed by the equation 
where fhttl;j is the time rate of change of the r;rM trace, or adaptive weight, Wij from the i 1" 
.F1 node to the .i 1" F 2 node, J(:rj) is the learning gating signal that becomes positive only if 
the postsynaptic activity, or potential, 1:1 of the .i1" .r2 node becomes sufficiently large, and 
Hi is the ith bottom-up signal. This learning rule was introduced into neural network models 
in Grossberg (1969a) and is the learning rule that was used to introduce ART (Grossberg, 
1976b). While tracking the signals in its pathway, such an LTM trace wii can either increase 
(if the signal S'i is large) or decrease (if the signalS; is small). It thus combines Hebbian and 
anti-Hebbian learning properties in a way that has been used to model neurophysiological 
data about hippocampal r;rp and LTD (Artola and Singer, 199:3; Levy, 1985; Levy and 
Desmond, 1985) and adaptive tuning of cortical feature detectors during the visual critical 
period (Rauschecker and Singer, 1979; Singer, 198:3). 
In particular, as Table I shows, significant postsynaptic activity, mediated by the gating 
signal j(J:1), is needed to cause any change in wii· If this modulatory gate opens, then Wij 
may increase or decrease, depending upon the relative size of Si· Since S;, in turn, may 
influence the amount of postsynaptic activity x1 via the presynaptic signal S';w;i, various 
secondary effects can occur that are beyond the scope of this discussion (but see Carpen-
ter and Grossberg, 1990). It is perhaps worth noting, however, that an early prediction 
4 
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(Grossberg, 1968b, 1969b, 1974) suggested that synaptic learning would be mediated by a 
postsynaptic process of protein synthesis and receptor sensitization that controls a coordi-
nated presynaptic process of transmitter production. The postsynaptic signal process was 
predicted to be triggered by an inward Ca++ current; that is antagonistic to Mg++. Coor-
dinated presynaptic and postsynaptic changes were predicted to depend upon the inward 
Ca++ current in synergy with an inward Na+ current and an outward K+ current. Similar 
concepts have been used, in greatly elaborated form, to explain recent data about LTP and 
LTD; e.g., see Artola and Singer (199:3) and Kuno (1995). Gated steepest descent learning 
may thus be viewed as a first approximation to a much more complex cascade of biochemical 
events. 
Table 1 
The net effect of such leaming is to train the L'TM vectors of the winning F2 category 
nodes to become more similar to the STM patterns tha.t they filter. As a result, the winning 
F2 categories sharpen their tuning curves to respond more selectively to the STM patterns 
that they have experienced. 
Self-organizing feature map models were introduced and computationally characterized 
in Malsburg (197:3) and Grossberg ( 1976a, 1978). These models were subsequently applied 
and further developed by many authors, notably Kohonen (1984). They exhibit many useful 
properties, especially if not too many input patterns, or dusters of input patterns, perturb 
level F1 relative to the number of categorizing nodes in level F2. Grossberg (1976a) proved 
under these sparse environmental conditions that category learning is stable, with LTM traces 
that track the statistics of the environment, are self-normalizing, a.nd oscillate a minimum 
number of times. Also, the :Fz category selection rule, like a Bayesian elassifier, tends to 
minimize enor. 
It was also proved, however, that under more general environmental conditions, learning 
becomes unstable and subject to catastrophic forgetting. Such a model could forget the faces 
of your parents while learning a. new face. This memory instability is due to basic properties 
of associative learning and lateral inhibition. Although a gradual switching ofT of plasticity 
can partially overcome the problern, such a. mechanism cannot work in a learning system 
whose plasticity is mainta,ined throughout adulthood. These results put into sharp focus 
the problem of how the brain dynamically self-stabilizes its memory while remaining open 
to new experiences throughout life, a topic: that bas attracted increasing interest (Kandel 
and O'Dell, 1992). An analysis of this instability, together with data about categorization, 
conditioning, and attention, led to the introduction of ART models that self-stabilize the 
memory of self-organizing feature maps in response to an arbitrary stream of input patterns 
(Grossberg, 197Gb). 
In an Altr model, learning does not occur when some winning F2 activities a.re stored in 
STM. Instead activation of :F2 nodes may be interpreted a.s "making a hypothesis" about an 
input at :F1 . When F2 is activated, it quickly generates a.n output pattern that is transmitted 
along the top-down adaptive pathways from F 2 to :F1 . These top-down signals are multiplied 
in their respective pathways by r;rM traces a.t the semicircular synaptic knobs of Figure 2B. 
The LTM-gated signals from <1ll the active F 2 nodes are added to generate the total top-
down feedback pattern from F2 to F1. This pattern plays the role of a learned expectation. 
Activation of this expectation may be interpreted as "testing the hypothesis", or "reading 
5 
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out the prototype", of the active Fz category. As shown in Figure 2B, ART networks are 
designed to match the "expected prototype" of the category against the bottom-up input 
pattern, or exemplar, to F1. Nodes that are activated by this exemplar are suppressed if they 
do not correspond to large LTM traces in the top-down prototype pattern. The resultant 
F 1 pattern encodes the cluster of input features that the network deems relevant to the 
hypothesis based upon its past experience. This resultant activity pattern, called X* in 
Figure 2B, encodes the pattern of features to which the network "pays attention". 
If the expectation is close enough to the input exemplar, then a state of resonance de-
velops as the attentional focus takes hold. The pattern X* of attended features reactivates 
the ;:2 category Y which, in turn, reactivates X* The network locks into a resonant state 
through a positive feedback loop that dynamically links, or binds, X* with Y. Damasio 
( 1989) has used the term "convergence zones" to describe such a resonant process. Such res-
onances are capable of binding spatially distributed features into synchronous and coherent 
states, both in cortico-cortical and thalamocortical feedback networks (Grossberg, 1976b; 
Grossberg and Somers, 1991 ). 
Neurophysiological data that are consistent with the prediction that ART-like resonances 
exist between LGN and VI have recently been reported (Sillito, .Jones, Gerstein, and West, 
1994). In particular, it was suggested in Grossberg (1980) that top-down corticogeniculate 
feedback would selectively amplify monocular LGN activations that are consistent with the 
oriented binocular cortical cells that activate the feedback, while inhibiting LGN cells that 
are not. In addition, top-down feedback by itself, as in a.ll AHT systems, was suggested not 
to be fully able to activate LGN cells. ln support of this prediction, Sillito et a.l. (1994) 
reported that "cortically induced correlation of relay cell activity produces coherent firing 
in those groups of relay cells with receptive field alignments appropriate to signal the par-
ticular orientation of the moving contour to t;he cortex ... this increases the gain of the 
input for feature-linked ev('nts detected by the cortex ... the cortico-thalamic input is only 
strong enough to exert an effect on those LGN cells that are additionally polarized by their 
retinal input ... the feedback circuit searches for conelations that support the 'hypothesis' 
represented by a particular pattern of cortical activity" (pp. 47~)-482). Gove, Grossberg, 
a.nd Mingolla (1995) have shown how this type of corticogenieulate feedba,ck and resonance 
can be used as part of a larger model of cortical visual processing to simulate data about 
brightness perception ;wd illusory contours. 
Similar AHT matching and resonance rules have been used to explain and predict behav-
ioral and brain data from other task domains. For example, Carpenter and Grossberg (1993) 
have used ART matching and resonance rules to explain data about visual object recogni-
tion and medial temporal amnesia (see below). Govindarajan, Grossberg, Wyse, and Cohen 
(1994) have used ART matching and resonance rules to simulate auditory psychophysical 
data about acoustic source segregation when multiple sources harmonically overlap, as dur-
ing a cocktail party. Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen (1994) have used AHT matching and 
resonance rules to simulate psychophysical data about variable-rate speech categorization. 
Grossberg and Stone (1986a) have used such rules to explain data about lexical priming and 
deeision making. Roberts, Aguilar, Bullock, and Grossberg (1994) have used ART match-
ing and resonance rules to explain neural data about multimodal control of saccadic eye 
movements. Why should similar matching and resonance rules be used in so many brain 
systems? 
6 
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ART shows how these matching and resonance rules can be used to help solve the 
noise-saturation dilemma in any brain system that dynamically adjusts and maintains its 
parameters to cope with changing environmental conditions throughout life. The matched 
resonant state, rather than bottom-up activation, is predicted to drive the learning process. 
The resonant state persists long enough, at a high enough activity level, to activate the 
slower learning process; hence the term adaptive resonance theory. ART systems learn 
prototypes, rather than exemplars, because the attended feature vector X*, rather than the 
input exemplar itself, is learned. Both the bottom-up LTM traces that tune the category 
nodes and the top-down LTM traces that filter the learned expectation learn to correlate 
activation of F2 nodes with the set of all attended X* vectors that they have ever experienced. 
These attended STM vectors assign less STM activity to features in the input vector I that 
mismatch the learned top-down prototype V than to features that match V. 
Prototype Learning or Exemplar Learning? 
A similar type of Imttching by similarity across arrays of features has been used to 
quantitatively fit categorization data from human subjects (Estes, 1994). Models of this 
type assume that every input exemplar that a subject has ever experienced is stored, leading 
to formidable problems of memory storage and retrieval. Such models have not yet been 
shown capable of real-time autonomous categorization of complex databases. ART models 
computationally elaborate the idea that huma.ns learn prototypes (Posner and Keele, 1968, 
1970), which save greatly on memory resources by allowing many exemplars to be represented 
by a. single category prototype. AHT models have also been used for real-time autonomous 
categorization of complex databases (e.g., Asfour, Carpenter, and Grossberg, 1995; Asfour 
ci al., 199:3; Bachelder, Waxman, and Seibert, 199:3; Baloeh and Waxman, 1991; Braclski 
and Grossberg, 1994; Carpenter ct al., 1992; Carpenter, Grossberg, and Reynolds, 1991, 
1995; Carpenter and Ross, 1993; Carpenter and Tan, 199:3; Candell, Smith, Escobedo, and 
Anderson, 1 994; Dubrawski and Crowley, 1994; Gjerdingen, HWO; Goodman et al., 1992; 
Ham and Han, 199:3; Harvey, 199:3; Kasperkiewicz, Racz, and Dubra.wski, 1994; Keyvan, 
Durg, and Rabelo, 199:3; Metha, Vij, and Ra.belo, 199:3; Moya, Koch, and Hostetler, 199:3; 
Seibert and Waxman, 1992; Suzuki, Abe, and Ono, 1994; Suzuki, 1995; Wienke, Xie, and 
Hopke, 1994). 
Given that AHT systems learn prototypes, how can they also learn to recognize unique 
experiences, such a.s a particular view of a friend's face? The prototypes learned by ART 
systems accomplish this by realizing a qua.litatively different concept of prototype than that 
ofFered by previous models. In particular, AitT prototypes form in a way that is designed 
to conjointly maximize category generalization while minimizing predictive error (Carpen-
ter, Grossberg, and Reynolds, 1991; Carpenter et al., 1992). As a result, ART prototypes 
can automatically learn individual exemplars when environmental conditions require highly 
selective discriminations to be made. How the matching process achieves this is cliscussecl 
below. 
Before describing how this is a.chieved, let us note what happens if the mismatch between 
bottom-up and top-clown information is too great for a resonance to develop. Then the 
F2 category is quickly reset and a memory search for a better category is initiated. This 
combination of top-down matching, attention focusing, and memory search is what stabilizes 
Artr learning and memory in an arbitrary input environment. The attentional focusing by 
7 
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top-down matching prevents inputs that represent irrelevant features at F1 from eroding the 
memory of previously learned LTM prototypes. In addition, the memory search resets :F2 
categories so quickly when their prototype V mismatches the input vector I that the more 
slowly varying LTM traces do not have an opportunity to correlate the attended :F1 activity 
vector X* with them. Conversely, the resonant event, when it does occur, maintains and 
amplifies the ma.tehed STM activities for long enough and at high enough amplitudes for 
learning to oecur in the LTM traces. 
Whether or not a resonance oceurs depends upon the level of mismatch, or novelty, that 
the network is prepared to tolerate. Novelty is measured by how well a given exemplar 
matches the prototype that its presentation evokes. The criterion of an aceeptable match is 
defined by an internally controlled pammeter p called vigilanee (Carpenter and Grossberg, 
1987a, 1992). The vigilance parameter is computed in the orienting subsystem A; see Fig-
ure L Vigilanee weighs how similar an input exemplar I must be to a top-down prototype 
V in order for resonanee to oecur. Resonance occurs if pill- IX* 1 :::; 0. This inequality says 
that the :F1 attentional focus X* inhibits A more than the input I excites it. If A remains 
quiet, then an F1 .-. :F2 resom1nce can develop. 
Either a larger value of p or a smaller match ratio IX*IIII-1 makes it harder to satisfy 
the resonance inequality. When p grows so large or IX*IIII-1 is so small that plli-IX*I > 0, 
then A generates an arousal burst, or novelty wave, that resets the STM pattern across :F2 
and initiates a bout of hypothesis testing, or memory se<1rch. During seareh, the orienting 
subsystem interacts with the attentional subsystem (Figures 2C and 2D) to rapidly reset 
mismatched categories and to select better :F2 representations with which to categorize novel 
events at :F1, without risking unselective forgetting of previous knowledge. Search may select 
a familiar category if its prototype is similar enough to the input to satisfy the resonance 
criterion. The prototype may then be refined by attentional focussing. If the input is too 
different from any previously learned prototype, then an uncommitted population of :F2 cells 
is selected ;wd learning of a new category is initiated. 
Bec<1use vigilance can v;1ry across learning trials, recognition categories capable of en-
coding widely differing degrees of generalization or <1bstraction c;w be learned by a single 
ART system. Low vigilance leads to broad generalization and abstract prototypes. High 
vigilance leads to narrow generalization and to prototypes that represent fewer input exem-
plars, even a single exemplar. Thus a single ART system may be used, say, to learn abstract 
prototypes with which to recognize abstract categories of faces and dogs, as well as "exem-
plar prototypes" with which to recognize individual faces and dogs. A single system can 
learn both, as the need arises, by increasing vigilance just enough to activate A if a previous 
categorization leads to a predictive error (Carpenter et al., 1992; Carpenter, Grossberg, and 
Reynolds, 1991 ). 
Corticohippocampal Interactions and Medial Temporal Amnesia 
As sequences of inputs are practiced over learning trials, the search process eventually 
converges upon stable categories. It has been mathematically proved that familiar inputs 
direetly aecess the category whose prototype provides the globally best match, while unfa-
miliar inputs engage the orienting subsystem to trigger memory searches for better categories 
until they become familiar (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987a, 1992). This process contin-
ues until the memory capacity, whieh can be chosen arbitrarily large, is fully utilized. The 
8 
March 9, 1995 
process whereby search is automatically disengaged is a form of memory consolidation that 
emerges from network interactions. Emergent consolidation does not preclude structural 
consolidation at individual cells, since the amplified and prolonged activities that subserve 
a resonance may be a trigger for learning-dependent cellular processes, such as protein syn-
thesis and transmitter production. 
The attentional subsystem of AHT has been used to model aspects of inferotempora.l 
(IT) cortex, a.nd the orienting subsystem models part of the hippocampal system. The 
interpretation of AHT dynamics in terms of IT cortex led Miller, Li, and Desimone (1991) 
to successfully test the prediction that cells in monkey IT cortex are reset after each tria.! 
in a. working memory task. To illustrate the implications of an ART interpretation of IT-
hippocampal interactions, Carpenter and Grossberg (199:3) have described how a lesion of the 
ART model's orienting subsystem creates a formal memory disorder with symptoms much 
like the medial temporal amnesia that is eaused in animals and patient HM after hippocampal 
system lesions. In particular, such a lesion in vivo causes unlimited anterograde amnesia.; 
limited retrograde amnesia; failure of consolidation; tendency to learn the first event in a 
series; abnormal reactions to novelty, including persevera.tive reactions; normal priming; and 
normal information processing of familiar events (Cohen, 1984; Graf, Squire, and Mandler, 
1984; Lynch, McGaugh, and Weinberger, 1984; Squire and Butters, 1984; Squire a.nd Cohen, 
1984; Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1974; Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1990). 
Unlimited anterograde amnesia occurs because the network cannot carry out the memory 
search to learn a new recognition code. Lirnited retrograde amnesia occurs because familiar 
events can directly access correct recognition codes. Before events become familiar, memory 
consolidation occurs which utilizes the orienting subsystem (Figure 1c). This failure of con-
solidation does not necessarily prevent learning per se. Instead, learning influences the first 
recognition category activated by bottom-up processing, much as "amnesics are particularly 
strongly wedded to the first response they learn" (Gray, 1982, p. 25:l). Persevera.tivereactions 
can occur because the orienting subsystem cannot reset sensory representations or top-down 
expectations that may be persistently mismatched by bottom-up cues. The inability to 
search rnernory prevents ART from discovering more appropriate stimulus combinations to 
attend. Normal priming occurs because it is rnedi<ttecl by the attentional subsystem. 
Similar behavioral problems have been ident,ifiecl in hippocampectomizecl monkeys. Gaf-
fan (1 985) noted that fornix transection "impairs ability to change an established habit 
... in a different set of circumstances that is similar to the first and therefore liable to be 
confused with it" (p. fl4). In ART, a defective orienting subsystem prevents the memory 
search whereby different represent<ttions could be learned for similar events. Pribrarn (1986) 
called such a process a "competence for recombinant context-sensitive processing" (p. :362). 
These AHT mechanisms illustrate how memory consolidation and novelty detection ma.y be 
mediated by the same neural structures (Zola-Morgan and Squire, Hl90), why hippocampee-
tomized ntts have difficulty orienting to novel cues (O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978), and why there 
is a progressive reduction in novelty-related hippocmnpal potentials as learning proceeds in 
normalntts (Deadwyler, West, a.nd Lynch, 1979; Deadwyler, West, and Robinson, 1981). In 
AHT, the orienting system is automatically dis<ongaged a.s events become familiar during the 
memory consolidation process. 
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A Comparison of Hippocampal Learning Models 
This review of ART properties enables us to comment on recent data and models about 
the hippocampal system. In particular, the novelty-sensitive matching and memory search 
properties that are modulated by the ART orienting subsystem suggest how the hippocam-
pal systern rnay contribute to flexible expression of memories in novel contexts and why hip-
pocarnpalneurons respond differently to match and non-match conditions (Otto and Eichen-
baum, 1992). Indeed, mismatc:hes within the attentional system trigger memory searches for 
better recognition categories by activating the orienting subsystem. 
Knowlton and Squire (199:l) have reported that amnesics can classify items as members of 
a large category even if they are impaired on remembering the individual items themselves. 
To account for these results, the authors proposed that item and category memories are 
formed by parallel brain systems. This hypothesis does not, however, explain what these 
systems are, how they intemct, or how some large categories may form even though item 
memories, that may be viewed as "specific" or "concrete" categories, do not. These authors 
also noted that "the possibility must be considered that classification learning is dependent 
on deelarative knowledge ... amnesic patients did perform numerically worse than the control 
subjects" (Knowlton and Squire, 199:l, p. 1748). Within an ART model, coarse categories 
tend to form when the orienting subsystem is inoperative because there is no vigilance 
control or memory seMch. Thus the coarse categories and a tendency to persevera.tion go 
together in this case. Carpenter and Grossberg ( 1987b; see also Carpenter and Grossberg, 
1991) provided simulation examples of coarse eategory learning with zero vigilance in which 
each category can be activated by multiple exemplars. Finer item-specific categories that 
match their structure to environmental demands can form when the orienting subsystem is 
active. These model properties enable the amnesic data pattern to be rationalized without 
requiring that item and category memories be coded by parallel brain systems. ART does 
not, however, deny that categories for individual events and for sequences of events may 
form at distinct levels of a single hierarchically-organized memory system (Grossberg, 1978, 
1987), rather than in a pair of parallel memory systems. 
AHT properties also provide an alternative to the popular hypothesis that the hippocam-
pal formation somehow temporarily stores recognition codes from all sensory modalities be-
fore the temporal cortex can more permanently do so (Eichenbaum, Otto, and Cohen, 1994; 
Marr, HJ71; McClelland, McNaughton, and O'Reilly, 1994; Milner, 1989). This hypothesis 
faces formidable obstacles as soon as one seriously tries to model how such a process could 
work. For example, how could the hippoeampa.l system rapidly store all the information 
that one cm1 rec:all after seeing an exciting movie? McClelland, McNaughton, and O'Reilly 
( HJ94) admit that their model cannot do this. In fact, not only is fast learning impossible, 
but also "the sequential acquisition of new da.ta ... c:an lead to catastrophic interferences 
with what has previously been learned". Only if learning is slow a,nd carefully interleaved 
on suflieiently small and regular databases can it occur at all in this type of model. Such a 
model fails to solve the stability-plastic:ity dilemma. 
A more general concern is that these models do not consider the nature of the repre--
sentations that are learned in any realistic: behavioral experience. For example, how could 
the known anatomy of the hippocampal formation rapidly learn to represent all the types of 
sensory information---visual, auditory, touch, ete.-that specialized thalamo-neocortieal sys-
tems have evolved to represent? I-I ow c:oulcl it then selectively transfer this information back 
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into the respective cortical systems'? This is a problem about the nature of the proposed 
hippocampal representation and about the capacity of the hippocampus to rapidly store 
vast amounts of information. These models seem to seriously underestimate the complexity 
and subtlety of these issues by discussing small-scale toy problems that do not attempt to 
represent any nontrivial sensory information in a real-time learning environment. 
To clarify some of the representational difficulties in broad strokes, let us consider several 
illustrative options: (I) the mapping between cortex-to-hippocampal system is one-to-one; 
(2) the mapping from cortex to hippocampal system is many-to-one and the reverse map-
ping is one-to-many; (3) the temporary hippocampal storage is in some form of STM; (4) 
the temporary hippocampal storage is in some form of LTM. Options (I) and (2) may be 
combined with options (3) and (4) into four cases: (1,:3), (I,4), (2,3), and (2,4). 
Consider cases (I ,:3) and ( l ,4). These seem impossible because the hippocampal system 
does not have nearly enough cells to represent. in a one-to-one fashion all of the cellular 
activation patterns over all of the sensory cortices. Consider case (2,:3). This implies that 
the sensory cortices transform sensory inputs into activations of sensory feature detectors of 
various sorts, after which these cortical STM activation patterns are compressed by many-
to-one pathways into STM activa.tions of multimodal hippocampal categories. Apart from 
the general problem that STM does not have nearly a large enough memory capacity to 
store the amounts of information in question (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 197I; Miller, I956), 
the reverse one-to-many rna.pping from hippocampal system to cortex cannot recover the 
full dimension of the original cortical STM patterns without the intervention of some sort of 
J;rtvi that organizes the signal traffic between the hippocampal system and cortex. 
This leaves case (2,4) in which, after the cortex filters incoming sensory information, 
rnultimodal hippocampal categories are learned by reciprocal interactions between cortex 
and the hippocampal system. Here the pathways between cortex and hippocampus would 
rapidly store r;rM traces to organize the reciprocal signal traffic. The hippocampaJ system 
would later read out this information so that the slower cortical learning could somehow 
catch up. Such a system experiences the full burden of the stability-plasticity dilemma, 
which these models were not designed to do. Fast learning of such a system in response 
to a rich and varying input environment, can cause catastrophic forgetting (Carpenter and 
Grossberg, I987a; Grossberg, HJ7Ga, 1988b ). H forgets what it has learned even as it is 
trying to learn more. However, if the hippocampal system cannot learn the data quickly, 
then it cannot impart this knowledge to the more slowly learning cortical system. Could 
this problem be avoided by incorporating ART dynamics into such a. model? 
This does not seern possible, because another problem faces such a hypothesis; namely, 
that all the system's learning is trapped in LTM traces that lie between the cortex and the 
hippocampal system. This learned information could not be direct.ly transferred to other 
cortical learning systems by any local operation. For direct transfer of this LTM to happen, 
nonlocal transport of LTM traecs would be needed from one corticohippocampal pathway 
to a spatially disjoint thalamo-cortical or corticocortical pathway. Such an operation is 
physieally inconceivable. An J;rM trace is not a number in a register, to he simply copied 
from one place to another. It is a complex metabolic interaction between parts of cells that 
captures the degree of interaction between those neurons. That degree of interaction depends 
upon the internal states of the neurons involved, as well as upon a variety of other factors. 
In order to transfer that learned information to some other part of cortex, it would need to 
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be "read-out" back into the original cortical memory store. Thus the hippocampally stored 
LTM information could only be read back to cortex indirectly by using the LTM traces to 
reactivate the original cortical STM patterns. lf, however, these reactivated cortical STM 
patterns can then incite corticocortical learning, why could they not do so originally? 
The only plausible alternative remaining is that the hippocampal system reads these 
STM patterns into the cortex many times so that the slow cortex can gradually learn them 
over many learning trials. This is the type of assumption that McClelland, McNaughton, 
and O'Reilly (1994) make. This hypothesis implies the existence of a highly sophisticated 
hippocampal controller that could reproduce the experiences of a whole day many times 
across the entire cortex without interfering with the processing of other experiences. This 
cannot, by the nature of cortical representation, happen during waking hours without in-
terfering with the STM registration of ongoing experiences. Moreover, there is simply not 
enough time during sleep to reproduce multiple recollections of a previous day's experiences 
unless one is asleep much longer than one is awake. Nor do sleep EEGs reproduce waking 
cortical patterns most of the time. 
These problems are avoided in AHT systems. The AHT orienting subsystem is even-
tually disengaged as novel inputs become incorporated through practice into the context 
of other learned knowledge and eventually become familiar to the attentional subsystem. 
Such a model consolidation process is consistent with the temporary nature of hippoeam-
pal engagement during learning and the temporally graded nature of retrograde amnesia. 
However, uo recognition codes are ever stored within an AHT orienting subsystem. Rather, 
interactions between the orienting and attentional subsystems enable the latter to stably 
leaxn new recognition categories whose structure is sensitive to environmental relationships 
and the global organization of previously learned knowledge. Thus ART models suggest how 
le;nning within thalamocortieal and corticocortical systems may be modulated by hippocam-
pal interactions without requiring that the hippocampal system actually store the learned 
rep res en tations. 
A Prediction about Prototype Learning 
The AHT conception of temporal-hippocampal interactions suggests the following pre-
diction. Level F2 properties may be eompared with properties of cell activations in infero-
ternporal cortex (IT) during reeognition learning in monkeys. The ability of F2 nodes to 
learn categories with different levels of generalization clarifies how some IT cells can exhibit 
high specificity, such as selectivity to views of partieular faces, while other cells respond to 
broader features of the animal's environment (Desimone and Ungerleider, 1989; Gochin et 
al., 1991; Harries and Perrett, 1991; Mishkin, 19R2; Mishkin and Appenzeller, 1987; Perrett, 
Mistlin, and Chitty, 1987; Schwartz et al., 198:3; Seibert ;wd Waxman, 1991). Moreover, 
when monkeys are exposed to easy and diffieult discriminations (Spitzer, Desimone, and 
Moran, 1988), "in the difficult condition the animals adopted a strieter internal criterion for 
discriminating matching from nonmatching stimuli ... the animals' internal representations of 
the stimuli were better separated, independent of the criterion used to discriminate them ... 
increased effort appears to cause enhancement of the responses and sharpened selectivity 
for attended stimuli" (pp. :3:39-:340). These are also properties of model cells in F2 due to 
the role of vigilance control. ART prototypes represent smaller sets of exemplars at higher 
vigilance levels, so a stricter matching criterion is learned. These exemplars match their finer 
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prototypes better than do exemplars which match a coarser prototype. This better match 
more strongly activates the corresponding F2 nodes. 
This property suggests that operations which make the novelty-related potentials of the 
hippocampus more sensitive to input changes may trigger the formation of more selective in-
ferotemporal recognition categories. Can such a correlation between IT discrimination and 
hippocampal potentials be recorded, say, when monkeys learn easy and difficult discrim-
inations? Conversely, operations that progressively block the expression of hippocampal 
novelty potentials are suggested to cause learning of coarser recognition categories, with 
amnesic symptoms as a limiting case. 
The conclusion that no learning occurs in the ART orienting syotem does not force 
the theory to deny that some types of learning do occur in the hippocampal system. The 
model suggests that these learning processes are involved in adaptively timed modulation of 
reinforcement learning and aspects of spatial orientation, as discussed below. 
A Framework for Temporal Learning 
Before turning to this discussion, it is appropriate to comment upon how an ART-based 
system could rapidly learn the information in a movie. There are many levels on which such 
a problem could he approached, and it seems fair to say that no available theory proposes 
a complete explanation of this competence. On the other hand, the critique of alternative 
models has been made on the level of their inability to rapidly and stably learn large amounts 
of information, notably temporally ordered information. This is not a problem in an AHT-
basecl system. 
A framework for accomplishing this was described in Grossberg (1978) using a combina-
tion of AHT category learning, working mernories, ternporal associative learning networks, 
and predictive feedbaek within the system. A grea.t deal of work has since been done to 
further carry out this program. For example, AHT-based arehitectures, called V!EWNET 
systems, <Lre capable of rapidly and stably learning to recognize 3-D objects by categorizing 
their 2-D views and learning to associate their 2-D view categories with :3-D object categories 
that are invariant under changes of familiar 2-D view (Hra.dski and Grossberg, 1994, 1995). 
Properties of these 2-D view a.nd :l-D object; category nodes may be compared with neural 
responses from distinct cell populations in monkey inferotemporal cortex (Logothetis et al., 
1994). 
The :3-D object categories may, in turn, be stored in a working memory (Baddeley, 1986) 
that ean encode both object representations and their temporal order in STM. This type of 
working memory is designed so that its contents may rapidly and stably be learned and cat-
egorized by another AHT network, whose active nodes are said to code list categories. This 
list categorization process has been proved to retain its stability even as new information 
continues to be stored in the working memory through time (Bradski, Carpenter, and Gross-
berg, 1992, 1994; Cohen and Grossberg, 1986, 1987; Grossberg, 1978; Grossberg and Stone, 
1986a.). Interactions between such a working memory and its list categories have been used to 
explain data from experiments about the sequential performance of stored motor commands 
(Boardman and Bullock, 1991; Grossberg and Kuperstein, 1989), about errors in serial item 
and order recall due to rapid visual a,ttention shifts (Grossberg and Stone, 1986a), about 
errors and reaction times during lexical priming and episodic memory experiments (Gross-
berg and Stone, 1986b), and about data concerning word superiority, phonemic restoration, 
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and backward effects on speech perception (Cohen and Grossberg, 1986; Grossberg, 1986). 
Such a working memory design thus seems to be used in several modalities. This is plausible 
when one realizes that the design embodies a few simple principles that enable its temporally 
evolving STM patterns to be stably categorized in LTM. 
Temporal cortex provides a likely neural substrate for such a working memory (Goldman-
Rakic, 1994). Here, information from multiple sensory modalities converges and may inter-
act with subcortical reward mechanisms to sustain an attentional focus upon salient goals 
(Gaifan, 1994; Knight, 1994). Can ART systems learn multimodallist categories and focus 
attention on predictively successful ones? 
Multimodal information distributed across a working memory may indeed be integrated 
into ART categories (Asfour, 1994; Asfour et al., 1993). Such an ART system, called Fusion 
ARTMAP, is designed to solve the credit assignment problem of selectively resetting those 
input channels that are causing predictive errors. In addition, ART models of cognitive-
emotional interactions have been described to suggest how attention may be selectively 
allocated to event categories that have high salience due to prior reinforcement and how less 
salient events may be attentionally blocked (Grossberg, 1975, 1982, 1984; Grossberg and 
Levine, 1987; Grossberg and Merrill, 1992); also see below. They have also been used to 
explain and predict cognitive data about human decision making under risk as a manifesta-
tion of cognitive-emotional neural mechanisms (Grossberg and Gutowski, 1987), and to shed 
some light upon how these cognitive-emotional interactions may break down during menta.! 
depression (Grossberg, 1972a, 1984). 
The rnotiw1tionally modulated list ea.tegories may, in turn, be reeurrently linked together 
by an associ<1tive learning network that helps to predict the categories most likely to occur 
in a given temporal context. Such networks have been used to model the position-dependent 
error gradients and learning rates that are observed during human verbal learning and to 
predict how this process breaks down in schizophrenic subjects (Grossberg, 1969c, 1982b; 
Grossberg <1!l(l Pepe, 1970, 1971). Finally, the attended list categories may be used to 
predict the next images that are expected by the system, a. one-to-many process called 
outstar learning (Grossberg, 1968a, 1978, 1980). One possible anatomical substrate of this 
type of predictive leaming is frontotemporal projections (Gaffan, 1994). 
Taken together, these architectural elements may be called a resonant avalanche. This 
name acknowledges the role of resonance in stabilizing the learning process, and of the 
avalanche of temporal associations in predicting the events that the system next expects to 
experience. (For a summary of avalanches at different levels of complexity, see Grossberg, 
1978.) Although the theory of resonant avalanches has not yet been completely developed, 
there are enough mathematical, computational, and data simulation results available to 
conclude that AHT systems escape the critique of other models that was proposed above. 
Adaptively Timed Cognitive-Emotional and Sensory-Motor Interactions 
Let us now return to the question of what sorts of leaming are predicted to occur in 
the hippocampal system by an ART-bas<'d model. As in our remarks about fronto-temporal 
interactions, this discussion will include an analysis of issues concerning reinforcement and 
temporal processing. The model fronto-temporal interactions that were reviewed above 
concern a type of macro-timing that integrates information across a series of events. The 
model fronto-temporal-hippocampal interactions now to be discussed consider a type of 
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micro-timing that calibrates how long motivated attention may be allocated to a single 
predicted event. 
Some authors (e.g., Eichenbaum, Otto, and Cohen, 1994) have dichotomized the repre-
sentationa.l properties of hippocampal memory processing-namely, those relating to recogni-
tion learning and memory-as being "orthogonal functional properties" from hippoeampal 
temporal processing properties. It is unclear why a single brain structure should combine 
properties if they are indeed "ort.hogonal". The adaptive timing model described below sug-
gests how these representational and temporal processes may be linked. The timing model 
is part of a larger model system that controls how cognitive-emotional and sensory-motor 
interactions are coordinated, including how classical and instrumental conditioning are adap-
tively timed and modulated by cognitive recognition processes (Ba.loch and Waxman, 1991; 
Grossberg, 1971, 1972a, 1975, 1982a, 1987; Grossberg and Levine, 1987; Grossberg and 
Merrill, Hl92; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1987). 
Figure :3 
This cognitive-emotional model suggests that (at least) three types of internal repre-
sentation interact during conditioning: sensory representations S, drive representations D, 
and motor representations M (Figure :3). The S representations are categorical thalamo-
cortical representations of extemal events, including the object recognition categories that 
are leamed by IT cortex and linked to frontal cortex via fronto-temporal interactions. The 
D representation.s include hypothalamic and amygdala circuits, at which homeostatic and 
reinforcing cues converge to generate emotional reactions and motivational decisions. The 
M representations include cerebellar circuits that control discrete adaptive responses. Three 
types of lc;uning take place among these representations: S ....., D conditioned reinforcer learn-
ing that converts a CS into a reinforcer by ]miring activation of its sensory representation S 
with activation of the drive representation D that receives input from a. salient US or other 
conditioned reinforcer CS; D....., S incentive motivational learning whereby an activated drive 
representation D may learn to prime the sensory representations S of all cues, including 
CS's, that have consistently been activated when it has; and S ....., M habit, or motor, learn-
ing whereby the sensory-motor maps, vectors, and gains tha.t are involved in motor control 
ma.y be aclaptively calibrated. 
These processes contribute to the modulation of declarative memory by motivational 
feedback a.nd to the learning a.nd performance of procedural memory. Thus lea.rned S ....., D....., 
S positive feedback quickly draws attention to motivationally salient cues and blocks acti-
vation of less salient cues via lateral inhibition among the S categories. D ....., S motivational 
feedback also energizes the release of discrete adaptive S ....., M responses. Based on a. theo-
retical analysis, the final common path of the drive representations D, at or after the stage 
at which motivational decisions are made, was predicted to intersect or be modulated by the 
hippocampal formation (Grossberg, 1975, 1982). In support of this prediction, Thompson et 
al. (1984, 1987) have shown that emotional eondit;ioning (as in tlw S....., D circuit) influences 
hippocampal sites, whereas motor conditioning (as in the S ....., M circuit) occurs within the 
cerebellum. In addition, hippocampal ablation attenuates blocking (Rickert, Bennett, Lane, 
and French, 1978; Schma.juk, Spear, and Isaacson, 198:3; Solomon, Hl77). Blocking fails 
in the model when D ....., S feedback is impaired, as follows. In the complete model, when 
the S population activities that categorize conditioned reinforcers are amplified by strong 
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conditioned S __, D __, S attentional feedback, they can block activation of other S popula-
tions via S __, S lateral inhibition. When D __, S feedback is removed, amplification and its 
blocking effect are eliminated. See Grossberg and Levine (1987) for blocking simulations. 
These model properties clarify how damage to the hippocampal system that involves both 
its drive-modulatory and orienting functions can result in either impaired or abnormally 
strong utilization of contextual cues, and a failure of flexible reset and memory search for 
appropriate cues to attend. 
Why should a single brain region, like the hippocampal system, modulate both recog-
nition learning and reinforcement learning? We suggest that this is so in part because the 
same adaptive timing and orienting processes modulate both types of learning (Grossberg and 
Merrill, 1992; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1989). This linkage clarifies how the hippocampal 
system may mediate tasks like delayed non-match to sample (DNMS) wherein both temporal 
delays a.nd novelty-sensitive recognition processes are involved (GaJfan, HJ74; Mishkin and 
Delacour, 1975). The proposed adaptive timing and orienting properties of the hippocam-
pal system are envisaged to cooperate in the following way. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, 
S -~ D __, S feedback can rapidly focus attention on motivationally salient cues, as inhibition 
from D to the orienting subsystem inhibits orienting reactions that would otherwise occur 
in response to irrelevant situational cues. T'he inhibition from D to the orienting sybsystem 
helps to model competition between consummatory and orienting behaviors (Staddon, 1983). 
Another process is, however, needed to prevent the premature reset of attention by poten-
tially distracting irrelevant cues during variable task-specific delays. For example, suppose 
that an animal inspects a. food box right after a signal occurs that has regularly predicted 
food delivery in 6 seconds. Why is not the mismatch between the learned expectation of 
food and the percept of no-food treated like a predictive failure? Why, as often occurs when 
a previously rewarded cue is no longer rewarded, does the mismatch not trigger reset of at-
tention, frustration, forgel;ting, and exploratory behavior? Were this to happen, humans and 
animals would restlessly explore their environments without being able to wait for delayed 
rewards. 
Spectral Timing in the Hippocampus and Deficits due to its Removal 
We suggest that a "spectral timing" circuit S ~ T operates in parallel with the fast 
S __, D __, S emotional conditioning circuit (Figure 4) to maintain attention on salient cues 
during variable task-specific delays. Different populations of cells in T can be conditioned to 
respond selectively to different lSI intervals. The total population output sums the output 
from all cells in the spectrum. Remarkably, this population response accurately models the 
lSI, even though no single cell does (Figure 5). Learned S ~ T timing maintains inhibition of 
the orienting subsystem a.nd, in the example noted a.bove, enables attention to be maintained 
on motivationally salient goal-related cues within the 6 second delay. If food does not occur 
even after 6 or more seconds have elapsed, then the adaptive timing circuit becomes quiet, 
and subsequent ART mismatches can trigger attentional reset, frustration, forgetting, and 
exploration in a manner modeled in Gro:>sberg (1987). 
We predicted in Grossberg and Merrill (1992) that thio spectral timing circuit T exist:> 
in the hippocampal dentate-CA:3 region in order to explain neurophysiological data showing 
that hippocampal CA:l pyramidal cell firing often mirrors the temporal delays observed in 
the conditioned nictitating membrane response (Berger, Berry, and Thompson, 1986). We 
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suggested that subsets of hippocampal dentate cells respond at different rates to generate 
the spectral representation that controls the adaptively timed population response at CA3 
pyramidal cells. Nowak and Berger (1992) have reported experimental evidence that is 
consistent with this prediction. 
Figure 4 
If the hippocampal system is removed, should animals and humans always have problems 
with DNMS and related tasks that involve stimulus delays? In the model, when the timing 
circuit T is removed, attention may more easily be distracted from goal objects during 
task-related delays. On the other hand, if the orienting subsystem is also removed, then 
flexible reset of attention in response to novel events is impaired, thereby eliminat:ing a key 
mechanism whereby a distracting event could undermine performance. If the attentional 
system remains intact, then direct activations of individual recognition codes in response 
to a familiar event is still possible, ami the matching process pa se can partially update 
short term memory. However, the network can no longer flexibly search for the proper 
configuration of targets to attend, espeeially in the presence of complex spatial layouts that 
include distracting cues. The lack of timed control over variable delays can thus harm 
behavior more when it is necessary to shift attention among different sets of cues. Gaffan 
(1992) has described analogous data from hippocampectomized monkeys. 
Both DNMS performance at brief delays and single-pair object discrimination learning 
with brief intertrial intervals are spared in hippocampal subjects (Eichenbaum, Otto, and 
Cohen, 1994). In the model, this is also true because the fast S ~ D ~ S attentional 
circuit remains intact. Long interstimulus delays, say of a day, also spare the performance 
of animals in some conditions (Mishkin, Malamut, and Bacheva.lier, 1984). These results 
have led some investigators to claim that the hippocampal system subserves a memory 
store of intermedi<tte duration (Eichenbaum, Otto, and Cohen, 1994). As noted above, how 
the hippocampal system could c:re<1te such a representation before it is transferred to the 
appropriate neocortical representa.tions across several modalities has never been explained, 
and faces serious concept;ual diflicult.ies. 
The AHT rnodel does not need to posit any such hippocampal memory store. At short 
delays, the fast feedbackS~ D _, S system helps to focus attention on motivationally salient 
objects and to initiate attentional blocking. The failure of blocking at intermediate delays 
due to removal of the S ~ T circuit leads to abnorm11lly strong utilization of contextual cues. 
This processing failure causes little problem at long delays because potentially disruptive 
cues, being so widely separated in time, decay before they can compete for attention. These 
properties can be inferred from the model simulations of blocking by Grossberg and Levine 
(1987). It has not, to our knowledge, yet been tested whether the spectml timing circuit that 
is proposed to exist in dentate-CA:3 plays the role described above in the DNMS paradigm. 
Figure 5 
Spectrally Timed Gain Control in the Cerebellum 
Why is adaptive timing also needed in the motor conditioning eircuit? This need is 
clarified by the fact that the S ~ D ~ S circuit focuses attention quickly on motivationally 
salient cues and can thereby just as quickly activate the motor circuit (Figure 3). Without 
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acbptive timing within the motor circuit itself, the conditioned response could be prema-
turely released. Thus the dear survival advantage of attending quickly to motivationally 
important sensory events could disrupt the properly timed execution of responses contingent 
upon these events. The model suggests that this problem does not occur during normal 
behaviors because the hippocampal dentate-CA3 circuit and the cerebellar motor eircuit 
are both adaptively timed. These distinct timing functions have been dissociated through 
ablation (Ebner and Bloedel, 1981; Gilbert and Thach, 1977; Optican and Robinson, 1980; 
Thompson, 1988; Thompson et al., 1984, 1987) and lSI shift experiments during which the 
peak time of the hippocampal trace can change before the peak time of the discrete adap-
tive response (Hoehler and Thompson, 1980). The model suggests that orienting responses 
may be inhibited by the hippocampal dentate-CA3 timing eircuit during the same time in-
tervals when conditioned responses are disinhibited by the cerebellar timing circuit. This 
coordinated action extends the classical idea that consummatory and orienting responses are 
mutually inhibitory. 
Recent experiments on conditioning the rabbit NMR suggest that response learning oc-
curs within a subcortical cerebellar p<l.thway, whereas response timing occurs within the 
cerebellm· cortex (Perrett, Ruiz, and Mauk, 1993). If the cortical timing circuit is ablated, 
then motor responses are, indeed, prematurely released. These experimental results are 
consistent with the dassical hypothesis that a fast cerebellar motor pathway--here inter-
preted to be subcortical (Lisberger, 1988)-~can learn a conditioned gain appropriate to the 
response using climbing fiber inputs as a teaching signal (Albus, 1971; Fujita, 1982a, 1982b; 
Grossberg, 1969a, 196%; Grossberg and Kuperstein, 1986; Marr, 1969). 
We hypothesize, in addition, that adaptive timing is learned by a spectral timing circuit 
in which parallel fiber- Purkinje cell cortical synapses use climbing fiber inputs as a teaching 
sigm1l (Figure 6). In this conception, cortical learning opens a. timed gate by removing 
Purkinje cell inhibition from subcortical sites. As the timed gate opens, the subcortical 
motor pathway can read-out its learned gain with the correctly timed lSI between CS and 
US. Learned suppression of Purkinje cell output may be accomplished by conditioned long 
term depression, or r;rn (Hoehler and Thompson, 1980; Ito, 1984). Eight key data properties 
have been simulated by this model (Bullock, Fiala, and Grossberg, 1994): Model Purkinje cell 
activity decreases in the interval following the onset of the CS, rnodelnuclear cell responses 
rnatch CR topography, CR peak amplitude occurs at the US onset, a discrete CR peak shift 
occurs with a change in lSI between CS and US, mixed training at two different ISis produces 
a double-peaked CR, peak CR acquisition and response rates depend unimodally on the lSI, 
CR onset latency deereases during training, and rnaladaptively-timed small-amplitude CRs 
result from ablation of cerebellar cortex. 
Figure 6 
Sorne striking cellular <1lld circuit homologs exist between these model cerebellum and 
hippocampal timing mechanisms. Both control an inhibitory gate that modulates another 
learning process, and both occur on dendrites whose summed output across a spectrum of 
rate-sensitive cell sites determines the collective timed response. These similarities suggest 
the prediction that both the hippocampal dentate cell and cerebellar Purkinje cell dendrites 
may undergo similar biophysical events during conditioning. 
~ ~ 
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Cooperative Hippocampal and Cerebellar Timing During Serial Compound Con-
ditioning 
How do the hippocampal and cerebellar timing circuits cooperate during timed behav-
iors? We illustrate such cooperation below by explaining paradoxical data about. serial 
compound conditioning, during which a sequence CSr-CS2 -US of two CS's precedes a US 
(Kehoe and Morrow; 1984; Kehoe et al., 1979, 1987). Robust serial compound conditioning 
to CS1 can occur even if primary CS1-US conditioning at the same lSI, in the absence of 
CS2, is ineffective. This happens, for example, if the CS1-CS2 lSI = 2400 msec and the 
CS2-US lSI= 400 msec (Kehoe and Morrow, 1984). How does the occurrence of CS2 enable 
CS1 to bridge the 2800 msec lSI before US occurs? 
We suggest that. CS2 can reactivate the sensory representation S1 of CS1 via the drive 
representation D along the feedback pathway CS1 ~ S1 ~ D ~ Sz, and thereby restart the 
S1 ~ T and S1 ~ M timing cireuits. In particular, on the first learning trial, the activity of 
S1 does not persist until US oecurs, but the aetivity of S2 does. As a result, S2 ~ D and 
D ~ S2 eonditioning start to occur. On later learning trials, S1 is active when CS2 occurs. 
Thus S1 is aetive when S2 aetivates D. S1 can hereby also learn to activate D, and D can he 
reciprocally conditioned to both S1 and S2 via the D ~ S1 and D ~ S2 feedback pathways. In 
this way, activation of D by CS2 reactivates S1 and restarts its timing circuits, so that they 
are active when the US occurs. As a result, S1 ~ M conditioning of the NMR is possible, 
but is relea,sed earlier than the 2800 msec lSI between CS 1 and US. 
This exphmation clarifies why, if the lSI between CS 1 and CS2 is short enough, then CS2 
elicits less NMR conditioning than it does when it is conditioned to the US at the same lSI 
without the occurrence of CS 1 (Kehoe ct al., 1979). If the CS 1 -CS 2 delay is short enough, 
S1 can partially block Sz because S1 ~ D ~ S1 feedback is still strong when CS2 occurs. 
Conversely, if the total CS 1-US IS! is increased, then CS2 can elicit more NMR conditioning 
than it would in the absence of CS 1 . Here, S1 's activity subsides by the time Sz occurs, but 
it primes D with residual activity that can amplify S2 ~ D ~ Sz and Sz ~ T conditioning 
when CSz and US occur. Kehoe ct al. (199:1) have shown that a. spectral timing model can, 
indeed, be used to simulate key properties of serial compound conditioning data.. 
Concluding Remarks 
The neural model described herein suggests how the hippocampal system and cerebel-
lum may cooperate to control adaptively timed recognition leMning, motivated attention, 
and conditioned responding. The model clarifies how the hippocampal system may combine 
novelty-based modulation of recognition learning and reinforcement learning with a. eompe-
tence for ada.ptively timed attention and inhibition of orienting responses. In particular, it 
suggests how orienting responses may be inhibited by the hippocampal denta.te-CA3 timing 
circuit during the same time interval during which goal-oriented conditioned responses are 
released by a.daptively timed opening of the cerebellar Purkinje cell gate. 
The model distinguishes between the micro-timing that is needed to determine how long 
motivated attention needs to be focused on a single predicted goal event, and the macro-
timing whereby attention is maintained during the planned performance of a sequence of 
actions leading to a goal. Both sorts of timing would appear to be at work during many 
behaviors. A partially developed theory of how they are coordinated clarifies some aspects of 
the complex pattern of connections that exists between the temporal cortex, frontal cortex, 
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and hippocampal system. 
Why the hippocampal system should play a role in spatial orientation is also consistent 
with this modelling framework. This link is established when one poses the question of 
how an a.nirnal can direct its goal-oriented attentive behaviors among sets of environmental 
. . 
landmarks that vary in their motivational salience. Such a perspective is consistent with the 
proposal that the hippocampal system can play a role as a. cognitive map (Leonard and Mc-
Naughton, 1990; O'Keefe, 1990; O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978), suitably defined, without denying 
its relevance for the control of approach-avoidance behaviors (Amsel, 1993). How to compu-
tationally integrate the steering role of reinforcement and motivation into a. self-organizing 
network for spatial orientation remains an open problem. Despite these theoretical gaps, the 
ART models that have aJready been developed put mechanistic flesh on the metaphorical 
bones of declarative memory a.nd procedural memory by articulating new behavioral prin-
ciples, neural mechanisms, and experimental expla.mttions and predictions that ca.n be used 
to clarify how a freely moving individual Hexibly learns about and a.ct;s upon valued goa.! 
objects in a timely fashion. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure 1. An example of a model ART circuit in whieh attentional and orienting circuits 
interact. Level .F1 encodes a distributed representation of an event by a short term memory 
(STM) activation pattern across a network of feature detectors. Level .F2 encodes the event 
using a compressed STM representation of the .F1 pattern. Learning of these recognition 
codes oceurs at the long term memory (LTM) traces within the bottom-up and top-down 
pathways between levels .F1 and .F2 . The top-down pathways read-out learned expectations 
whose prototypes are matched against bottom-up input patterns at .F1 . The size of mis-
matches in response to novel events are evalua.t.ed relative to the vigilance parameter p of 
the orienting subsystem A. A large enough mismatch resets the recognition code that is 
active in STM at .F2 and initiates a memory search for a more appropriate recognition code. 
Output from subsystem A can also trigger an orienting response. (A) Block diagram of cir-
euit. (B) Individual pathways of circuit, inducling the input level .Fo that generates inputs 
to level .F1 . The gain control input g1 to level.F1 helps to instantiate the matching rule (see 
text). Gain control g2 to level .F2 is needed to instate a category in STM. 
Figure 2. AHT search for a recognition code: (A) The input pattern I is instated across 
the feature cletecton; at level .F1 as a short term memory (STM) activity pattern X. Input 
I also nonspecifically activates the orienting subsystem A; see Figure 1. STM pattern X 
is represented by the hatched pattern across .F1 . Pattern X both inhibits A and generates 
the output pattern S. Pattern S is multiplied by long term memory (LTM) traces and 
added at .F2 nodes to form the input pattern T, which activates the STM pattern Y across 
the recognition categories coded at level .Fz. (B) Pattern Y generates the top-down output 
pattern U which is multiplied by top-clown LTM traces and added at .F1 nodes to form 
the prototype pattern V that encodes the learned expectation of the active .Fz nodes. If 
V mismatches I at .F1 , then a new STM activity pattern X* is generated at .F1. X* is 
represented by the hatched pattern. It includes the features of I that are confirmed by V. 
Inactivated nodes corresponding to unconfirmed features of X are unhatched. The reduction 
in total S'I'M activity which occurs when X is transformed into X* C<1uses a. decrease in the 
total inhibition frorn .F1 to A. (C) If inhibition decreases suffieientJy, A releases a nonspecific 
arousal wave to .Fz, which resets the STM patt,ern Y at .Fz. (D) After Y is inhibited, its top-
down prototype signal is eliminated, and X can be reinstated at .F1 . Enduring traces of the 
prior reset lead X to activate a different STM pattern Y* at .F2. If the top-down prototype 
clue to Y* also mismatches I <1t .r1, then the search for an appropriate .F2 code continues 
until a. more appropriate .Fz representation is selected. Then an attentive resonance develops 
and learning of the attended data is initiated. [Reprinted with permission from Carpenter 
and Grossberg (199:3).] 
Figure 3. Schematic conditioning eircuit: Conditioned stimuli (CS;) activate sensory cat-
egories (Sc:sJ which compete among themselves for limited capacity short-term memory 
activation and storage, as at. level .Fz in an AHT circuit. The activated Scs, representations 
elicit trainable signals to drive representations D and motor command representations M. 
Learning from a sensory represent<ttion Scs, to a drive representation D is called conditioned 
reinforcer learning. Learning from D to a Sc:s, is called incentive motivational learning. Sig-
nals from D to Scs, are elicited when the combination of conditioned sensory plus internal 
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drive inputs is sufficiently large. Sensory representations that win the competition in re-
sponse to the balance of external inputs and internal motivational signals can activate motor 
command pathways. 
Figure 4. A spectrally timed conditioning model with feedback pathways D ~ S(2) --+ S(1) 
that are capable of focussing attention in an adaptively timed fashion on reinforcing events. 
The sensory representations S of Figure :3 are here broken into two successive levels S(1) 
and S(2l. Levels S(l) and S(2) interact via reciprocal excitatory pathways. The excitatory 
pathways S(1) ~ D and D--+ S(2) are, as in Figure 3, adaptive. Representations in S(2) can, 
however, fire only if they receive convergent signals from S(l) and D. Then they deliver posi-
tive feedback to S(l) and bias the competition to focus attention on their respective features 
and to attentionally block inhibited featnres. Prior to conditioning, a CS can only be stored 
in STM at S(l) and can subliminally prime S(2) and D representations without supralimi-
naJly firing these representations. After conditioning, the CS can trigger strong conditioned 
S(l)--+ D--+ S(2) ~ S(1) feedback and rapidly draw attention to itself as it activates the emo-
tional representations and motivational pathways controlled by D. Representation D can also 
inhibit the orienting subsystem as it focuses attention upon motivationally valued sensory 
events. The sensory representations S(l) send parallel pathways to a spectral timing circuit 
T whose adaptive weights z sample the Now Print, or teaching signal, N that is transiently 
activated by changes in the activity of the drive representation D. After conditioning ofT 
takes place, adaptively timed readout from T can rnaintain attention on task-relevant cues 
for a learned duration via the T _, D _, S feedhaek pathway. Timed signals also inhibit the 
orienting subsystem via the T --+ D ~ A pathway and thereby help to prevent distracting 
events from interfering with planned consummatory acts. [Reprinted with permission from 
Grossberg and Merrill (1992).] 
Figure 5. A eomputer simulation of spectral timing: (a) In response to a CS input I; in 
Figure 4, a spectrum of population activities :r:;j react at different rates and generate signals 
/;1 = f(:r:;1); (b) each signal causes a transmitter Yij in its pathway to become inactivated, 
or habituate, at a different rate; (c) the transmitters Yij multiply, or gate, the signals fiJ 
to generate net signals.%= /;jYij that sample overlapping time intervals; (d) the sampling 
signals .% and the US, expressed via the teaching signal N, conjointly activate adaptive 
weights, or LTM traces, Zij, which generate adaptively gated output signals hij = 9ijZij; (e) 
although individual signals hij do not well time the lSI, the population sum R = Lj hij of 
the adaptive signals does accurately time the lSI (dotted vertical lines). [Reprinted with 
permission from Grossberg and Merrill (1992).1 
Figure 6. A model of adaptively timed cerebellar conditioning: US-activated climbing 
fibers provide a teaching signal that causes adaptively timed long term depression at parallel 
fiber-Purkinje cell synapses, thereby disinhibiting the inhibitory effect of tonic Purkinje cell 
outputs on cerebellar nuclear cells. The climbing fibers also control learning of adaptive 
gains along subcortical pathways through the nuclear cells. 'I'he net effect of learning is to 
open an adaptively timed Purkinje gate that enables learned gains to he expressed at the 
correct time. 
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Table 1: The instar learning, or gated steepest 
descent learning rule, embodies both Hebbian 
(LTP) and anti-Hebbian (LTD) properties within 
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